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FIDES QUAERENS INTELLECTUM: ST. ANSELM'S

METHOD IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY
Marilyn McCord Adams

This paper argues that Anselm's method in philosophical theology is shaped
by five fundamental factors. They are: (1) his appreciation of the ontological
incommensuration between God and creatures; (2) his commitment to the
infallible authority of Scripture as interpreted through the creeds and conciliar
pronouncements; (3) his conviction that humans are made in God's image;
(4) his conception of inquiry as essentially a Divine-human collaboration;
and (5) his understanding of human inquiry as holistic and developmental.

1. Orientation:
When we think of the relation between faith and reason, the questions that
readily spring to mind focus on the propositional content of religious belief,
and ask whether doctrinal propositions can be proved by sound arguments
from premisses acceptable to unbelievers, or, failing that, whether adherence
to such theses can be rationally justified? Perhaps this is because most of us
middle-aged Christian philosophers were trained in highly secular philosophy
departments and universities, and in any event live in an increasingly pluralistic society. Accordingly, we have responded to pressure from the outside to
defend the rationality of Christian faith. In the waning years of the Roman
empire, st. Augustine, too, was preoccupied with defending the faith, first
externally, against its pagan competitors (not only but principally the
Manichaeans); then against heretics (Donatists and Pelagians) within.
St. Anselm's eleventh century situation was different from both of these.
He spent most of his adult life (from age 26 to 60) in the Benedictine monastery at Bec. Most of his works were penned for and at the behest of his
monastic brother-students. Their over-arching common aim was to become
persons who could see and enjoy God's face. Their intellectual pursuits were
integrated into that project. De facto Anselm's written investigations of nontheological subjects were all occasioned by the exigencies of their doctrinal
inquiries. These facts a bout Anselm's career have left deep imprints on his
philosophical theology, not least on his method. If he was eventually drawn
into polemical contexts and confronted with real non-Christians, Anselm
continued to see the drive to understand Christian faith sola ratione as pre-
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dominantly internal, arising not simply from his individual monastic vocation, but from the natural teleology built into human nature itself.

II. Inquiry, the Viator s Vocation:
2.1. Ansellllian Anthropology: Christian Platonist that he was, Anselm held
that human nature, like every created nature, is an imperfect imitation of the
Supreme Nature, and has a telos-a "that-for-which-it-was-made" and for
which all of its powers were given. I In the Monologion, Anselm contends that
"every rational being exists for this [purpose]: to love or refuse things to the
extent that, by rational discernment, it judges them to be more or less good
or not good"2

and concludes in particular that "a rational creature is made for this [purpose]:
to love the Supreme Being above all [other] goods, inasmuch as It is the
Highest Good.") Likewise, in the Proslogion, Anselm recognizes the human
telos in the Divine invitation to the enjoyment of seeing God's face,4 which
will both occupy and fully satisfy all of the soul's powers.5 Again, in Cur
Deus Homo, he speaks of rational creatures' being made, and endowed with
reason and uprightness of will, for a happy enjoyment of God. 6
Anselm recognizes two significant obstacles to our reaching this goal. (i)
First and sufficient, is the ontological incommensuration between a simple,
immutable, and eternal God and fleeting creatures that "scarcely exist" by
comparison. 7 This metaphysically necessary fact has the consequence that
"God is a being greater than we can conceive of,"8 that the Divine nature is
permanently partially beyond our cognitive grasp,9 in some aspects fundamentally incomprehensible lo to us and inexpressible by human language. II
(ii) Second and reparable, is the damage suffered by human nature as a result
of Adam's faIl-loss of uprightness of will,12 blindness, weakness, and lack
of emotional control 13 -which mar its image of God and hinder smooth functioning. Balancing these, are twin reasons for optimism. (iii) For humans and
angels are rational natures made in God's image, among creatures the best
likenesses of God, veritable mirrors of God's face. 14 Rational creatures best
express this naturally impressed image, when they strive into God with all of
their powers, straining to remember, to understand, and to love Him above
all and for His own sake. ls On the one hand, the "organ" through which
humans grasp the object for the knowledge and love of which they/we were
made, is the whole self l6 ; and it functions best when all its powers are energetically engaged in this enterprise. On the other hand, the human being thus
occupied becomes a well-focussed image of God, one cognitively accessible
to the self who seeks the seemingly hidden Divine nature. (iv) Further, God
is of consistent purpose and has revealed a mysterious bias towards mercy,t?
which raises hopes of Divine grace for healing, cleansing, and restoring
human nature from its fallen condition,18 thereby strengthening it for its work.
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2.2. Ec-static Inquiry: Anselm the Christian thus approaches this difficult
human assignment with the hope necessary to persevere,19 and consistently
maintains that the appropriate response to the human predicament is strenuous effort to grasp what is beyond reach. In the Monologion, he twice gives
this philosophy succinct expression-in c.xv, in discussing the ineffability of
the Supreme Nature's "natural essence":
" ... For although I would be surprised if among the names or words which
we apply to things made from nothing, there could be found a [word] that
would appropriately be predicated of the Substance which created all [other]
things, nevertheless I //lust try to ascertain what end reason will direct this.
investigation ... "20

2md in c.xliii, in connection with the plurality and unity of the Supreme Nature:
"Having now discovered so many, and such important, properties of each[properties] by which a certain remarkable plurality, as ineffable as it is
necessary, is proved to exist in supreme oneness-I find it especially delightful to reflect more frequently upon such an impenetrable mystery ... "21

In other words, since the subject matter is extremely difficult, indeed ineffable and impenetrable, we should reflect upon it, try to understand it, again
and again!
Our problem is severe, however, because (fallen) human nature being as it
is, we begin ignorant of how to inquire. Thus, in the Proslogion, Anselm no
sooner turns aside to seek God's face, than he is forced to beg, "Come now,
therefore, my Lord God, teach my heart where and how to seek you, where
and how it may find you. "22 True, we have been endowed with powers to
pursue our telos, but these have been damaged. And in any event, they need
to be developed through extensive education. In De Concordia, Anselm
makes this point vividly with an agricultural simile:
" ... Without any cultivation on man's part the earth produces countless herbs
and trees by which human beings are not nourished or by which they are even
killed. But those herbs and trees which are especially necessary to us for
nourishing our lives are not produced by the earth apart from seeds and great
labor and a farmer. Similarly, without learning and endeavor human hearts
freely germinate, so to speak, thoughts and volitions which are not conducive
to salvation or which are even harmful thereto. But without their own kind
of seed and without laborious cultivation human hearts do not at all conceive
and germinate those thoughts and volitions without which we do not make
progress toward our soul's salvation ... "23

God is the primary teacher; Anselm, through the works he has left to us, a
"teacher's aid."
Many human powers need training. (a) According to Benedictine tradition,
the monastery was a school of obedience, training the will up to virtues. (b)
Anselm's Prayers and Meditations comprise exercizes to train the emotions,24
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according to a dialectical pattern reaching back through Benedict to Cassian
to Origen 25 : first the reader is stirred out of inertia into self-knowledge, which
produces sorrow for sin, dread of its consequences, and anxiety over distance
from God; the latter in turn produce humility and issue in prayers for help,
which resolve into a compunction of desire which energizes the soul's renewed search for God. Again, (c) Anselm's quartet of dialogues-De
Grammatico, De Veritate, De Libertate Arbitrii, and De Casu Diaboli-are,
among other things, exercizes to train students in the techniques of intellectual inquiry: in logic and modalities; in the art of definition; in constructing
counter-examples, analogies, and dilemmas; in drawing distinctions; in detecting instances of improper linguistic usage.
Moreover, these several powers interact and require to be coordinated.
Trivially, one cannot will what one does not conceive. 26 More profound is his
Christian-Platonist conviction that, where values are concerned, what you
love affects what you see. Thus, (l) Anselm assumes that even the
unbeliever's natural human desire for goods could motivate his Monologion
search for the source of goods perceptible to the senses or reason, an investigation which-in Anselm's mind-successfully proves that God is the good
that satisfies and that it is reasonable for every human being to commit
him/herself to God in living faith. But if he is sure that the reasoning of those
eighty chapters can bring unbelievers to intellectual assent to the existence
of God, he also insists that they will not be able to get much further unless
they join will to intellect and commit themselves to God in living faith.27
Likewise, (b) the Proslogion alternates prayer exercizes, designed to stir the
emotions and will (in cc. i, xiv-xviii, and xxiv-xxvi) so that the soul may seek
by desiring and desire by seeking, with the hope of finding by loving and
loving by finding,28 with sections of intellectual inquiry into the being of God
(cc.ii-xiii and xviii-xxiii), thereby focussing and re-focussing the whole self
as its investigation spirals upward towards increasingly inaccessible matters.
Again, (c) the Cur Deus Homo is skillfully structured to rouse the soul, not
only at the cognitive, but also at the affective and conative levels. First,
Anselm provokes Boso (and the reader) into an intellectually active posture,
by presenting inadequate patristic replies to current infidel objections (in
Book I, cc.ii-x). When Anselm seizes the initiative to present his own case,
Boso's emotional reactions trace the traditional prayer parabola-from mild
fear through growing anxiety to despair about the possibility of salvation (in
Book I, cc.xi-xxiv), and then up through expectant pleasure to exultant joy
in grasping how human redemption is possible through the Incarnation and
passion of Christ (in Book II, cc. vi-xix).
Anselm envisions the human search for God as throughout, in all its dimensions and phases, a matter of Divine-human collaboration, involving
initiative on both sides. (a) God makes the first move: by creating and em-
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powering rational creatures for beatific intimacy with Him. 29 God gave uprightness of will and the ability to preserve it for its own sake 30 ; God implanted the soul with a double inclination (affectio) for the good 3l ; and God
offered the gift of perseverance to everyone, stood ready to preserve creatures
in such salutary orientation of will and desires.32 But in order that rational
creatures might to some degree imitate God with respect to the aseity of
righteousness, the acceptance of this gift was left to their own free choice of
wilJ.33 Likewise, Divine consistency of purpose takes redemptive initiative
in the Incarnation and passion of Christ. 34 Yet, humans must ask for such
benefits to be applied to their own cases. 35 Similarly, Divine graces to repair
the soul's motivational structure are meted out bit by bit,36 because the very
exercize of repeated seeking is therapy that focuses the soul aright. Anselm's
written prayers and meditations are aids to this effort, patterns for asking
God, whose themes are well summed in the first:
"Almighty God, merciful Father, and my good Lord, have mercy on me, a
sinner. Grant me forgiveness of my sins. Make me guard against and overcome all snares, temptations, and harmful pleasures. May I shun utterly in
word and deed, whatever you forbid, and do and keep whatever you command. Let me believe and hope, love and live, according to your purpose and
your will. Give me heart-piercing goodness and humility; discerning abstinence and mortification of flesh. Help me to love you and pray to you, praise
you and meditate upon you. May I act and think in all things according to
your will, purely, soberly, devoutly, and with a true and effective mind. Let
me know your commandments, and love them, carry them out readily, and
bring them into effect. Always, Lord, let me go on with humility to better
things and never grow slack.
"Lord, do not give me over either to my human ignorance and weakness or
to my own deserts, or to anything, other than your lOVing dealing with me.
Do you yourself in kindness dispose of me, my thoughts and actions, according to your good pleasure, so that your will may always be done by me and
in me and concerning me. Deliver me from all evil, and lead me to eternal
life through the Lord. "37

(b) In the intellectual sphere, too, God takes the initiative: first, by creating
rational beings with intimate knowledge of Himself; then, by disclosing Himself to select human beings, and by providing Holy Scripture and ecumenical
Church councils. God sends the Holy Spirit to His people in every age,38
stands ready to help them understand the mysteries a little bit (aliquatenus)
more. Yet, as with Moses and the burning bush (Exodus 3:2-4), the creature
must turn aside to pay attention,39 give him/herself over to sustained inquiry;
the Christian ought accept by asking Divine aid,40 energeticalIy seek to understand what s/he has believed. 4l
Anselm makes this collaborative nature of intellectual inquiry fully explicit
in his most famous work, the Prosiogioll. As to genre, it is principally a
prayer-exercize for believers-neither a meditation in which the reader
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speaks silently with himself, nor a dialogue in which we are explicitly confronted with two speakers, but a pros logion or ad loquium in which the soul
speaks directly to God. The soul begins by asking questions of,42 putting
puzzles to,43 and/or begging help from God. 44 Then, God "illumines" the soul
so that it may "see,"45 "teaches"46 that it may understand. Anselm appeals,
"Tell your servant within, in his heart"47 that he may know. It then belongs
to the soul to articulate what God has revealed, usually expressing the reasoning and the statement of results 4B in second-person address to God, and
punctuating it with exclamation of thanks and praise. 49 Yet, one who prays
the Proslogion merely acknowledges the Divine-human interchange implicit in
all human intellectual inquiry, recognized or not. Just as the Christian reader may
meditate the Monologion and rehearse some of Anselm's dialogues without
thereby explicitly invoking Divine aid, so the unbeliever may remain an
unwitting partner, never tumbling to the presence or identity of that other
Spirit who guides his/her inquiry and furnishes "his/her" "aha"-insights.
If, for Anselm, intellectual inquiry is but one of several avenues along
which human beings seek goods/the GOOD/God, it does not follow that for
him practical reason expels theoretical, or that the latter is merely instrumentally related to the former. Anselm neither notes nor observes this Aristotelian distinction. Rather as one among other human powers, reason's
exercize is partially constitutive of the search of the whole self; the enjoyment
of its present and future results, integral constituents of the satisfaction for
which it was made. Thus, in his Commendatio of the Cur Deus Homo to Pope
Urban II, Anselm declares the ante-mortem understanding which faith seeks
and gains, to be a "mean" "between faith and sight,"50 and esteems it a great
source of ante-mortem consolation, joy, and delight. 5! Moreover, Anselm's
Christian Platonism allows him to extend these conclusions to the investigation
and appreciation of other subjects-logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics,
psychology and philosophy of mind. For all creatures are imperfect likenesses
of God,52 so that His glory can be (whether explicitly or implicitly) esteemed in
all His works. Likewise, all creatures are God's handiwork; a studied appreciation of them, a (witting or unwitting) swelling of their Maker's praise.

III. Authority as Thtor and Guide:
3.1. The Place of Authority in Human IlIquiry Generally: Authority has a role
to play in human illquiry, because oftell the subject-matter exceeds-for whatever reason, whether permanently or temporarily-the investigator 50 powers.
Because we (fallen) merely53 human beings are born ignorant and develop
our intellectual capacities only through long education, "right order" nearly
always 54 requires that we "believe" many things not only before we are able,
but in order to grow into a position to "understand." Of course, Anselm's
repetition of the Augustinian appeal to Isaiah 7:9 is famous. In several works,
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Anselm vows on behalf of himself and his Christian readers, that where
examination of the existence, nature, triunity, and redemptive activity of God
is concerned,
" ... 1 do not seek to understand in order that 1 may believe, but 1 believe in
order that 1 may understand. Moreover, 1 believe this: that 'unless 1 believe,
1 will not understand. '''55
Less noted are verbal echoes in dialogues about less mysterious subjects (viz.,
the motivational psychology and just deserts of rational creatures)56 where
the student uses such words simply to acknowledge that he is a beginner, who
ilS only now undertaking a systematic study of beliefs already acquired. Likewise, in Cur Deus Homo, Boso remarks the general human condition: "We
are very often certain about something without knowing how to prove it. "57
Yet, Anselmian education does not aim merely at handing down packages
of correct doctrine, but rather at developing the student s skills for inquiry.
Anselm's works, mostly written at the request of his students and reflective
of his pedagogical practices, consistently thrust the reader into an active role.
We are rarely treated to a straight exposition of Anselm's own views. Typically, he begins with assertions that seem obvious, then subjects them to
questions, objections, and aporetic arguments, which challenge the mind to
dig deeper. One favorite technique is to present arguments for apparently
contradictory conclusions, or proofs that none of the obvious answers to a
question can be correct. The reader is meant, not merely to pass his/her eyes
over the text, but actively to meditate the MO/Jologio/J, to pray the Proslogiol1,
1.0 identify in the dialogues with first one speaker and then the other. Thus,
whatever genre he chooses, Anselm continually seeks to limber up his readers
into intellectual flexibility, by first winning their sympathies for one position
and then jolting them with the attractiveness of its contradictory opposite.
All of Anselm's major treatises train the reader in argumentation, tricky
modal notions, the drawing of distinctions, the deployment of analogies, and
the detection of improper linguistic usage.
Anselm's "learn by doing" pedagogy is most clearly displayed in his quartet
of teaching dialogues-De Grammatico, De Veritate, De Libertate Arbitrii,
and De Casu Diaboli-where student/teacher relations model those of the
human investigator to God. These works give special emphasis to the development of student technique. Thus, the student is not allowed to raise the
initial question, only to sit back and play "yes-man" to teacher's answers. He
is required to retail the consideration and formulate the arguments that give
rise to his puzzlement. 58 Where the teacher's responses are concerned, his
role is to be a "tough customer," intolerant of ellipsis, vigorous in pressing
objections and requesting further explanations. 59 As the teacher tests the
student's proposals and arguments, so the student the teacher's: by offering
apparent counter-examples60 , constructing parallel arguments for absurd or
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opposing conclusions, drawing distinctions, diagnosing improper or suggesting technical linguistic usage. Moreover, Anselm's student shoulders some
of the responsibility for "putting two and two together," by pointing out
apparent incongruities between the teacher's position, on the one hand, and
Scriptural passages, patristic comments, and philosophical and/or theological
theses that pull in the reverse direction. In the Cur Deus Homo, Anselm's
best pupil Boso puts in a stellar performance. Still representing his
colleagues' worries by raising "silly" questions involving modal confusions,6l
he also probes into issues that lie beyond our solid soteriological information. 62 In addition, he volunteers as mouth-piece for the infidels' philosophical objections,63 and in that role presses the negative case against patristic
explanations, even to the point of formulating (Anselm's) classic refutation
of the Ransom Theory of the atonement. 64 At the same time, the dialogues
reflect student inexperience both as regards subject matter and technique. His
are the flawed arguments, the failed definition, the bogus counter-examples,
not to mention the lapsed attention and memory. If the student questions
occasion the discussion, its over-all direction, which recontextualizes issues
and burrows under surface objections to expose theoretical deep-structure65
and work a positive solution,66 belongs to the teacher!
Anselm's procedures reflect several further general facts about human capacity for inquiry. (i) The first is that, given a new technique, our eagerness
to use it tends to outrun our judgment about how and where to apply it. Thus,
in De Libertate Arbitrii, the student's selection of a definition in c.i 67 is
decisively rejected by counter-examples in c.ii.68 The student's own counterexamples are exposed as merely apparent, while his proposed addendum to
the teacher's definition is rejected as unnecessary,69 his objection from an
attempted parallel definition dismissed as a silly mistake. 70 Such failures arise
from a lack of a sufficiently broad perspective, from not making important
connections or keeping all of the relevant factors in mind. 7l (ii) Again, our
negative critical facility generally exceeds our positive constructive ability.
For example, in De Libertate Arbitrii, when the student's positive definition
of freedom of choice is quickly refuted, he retreats to the role of questioning
and evaluating the teacher's constructive attempts. Likewise, in Cur Deus
HOIllO, however impressive Boso's presentation of the infidel critique, it is
left to Anselm to mount the arguments for the necessity and soteriological
efficacy of the Incarnation. Characteristically, the student generates destructive dilemmas, apparent contradictions, arguments for the opposite conclusion, but it is the teacher who unravels these puzzles. (iii) Further, human
understanding is a process. Especially where matters are deep and difficult,
we typically cannot see through all of the issues at once. Consequently, it
often happens that however plausible an argument or explanation seems
today, we (or someone else) may think of a refutation or discover a still better
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theory tomorrow. It is un surprising to find Anselm, in the Cur Deus Homo,
declaring the mystery of human redemption inexhaustible, so that no matter
what humans may understand about it, there is still more to be learned and
explored. Often ignored is his similarly cautionary remark about semantic
theory at the end of De Grammatico: since the theory of signification was a
"hot topic" among logicians of that time, they could well be on the verge of
rendering Anselm's theory of signification obsolete!72
OveraIl, then, Anselm's pedagogical practice makes it clear that for him,
the point of believing authority is not to silence questions, but to enable the
student to ask sensible rather than silly ones, to point inquiry in a fruitful
direction, lest it come to a dead end!
3.2. Authority in Philosophical Theology: If reliance on authority is necessary for orienting us humans to the created world, a fortiori it is a "must" for
the philosophical theologian who probes into things Divine. Anselm himself
recognizes many authorities. (a) Obviously pre-eminent among them is God,
the Truth Itself,?3 who never deceives anyone,?4 and hence Christ, whom
Anselm deemed omniscient even in His human nature. 75 Together with the
Holy Spirit,?6 they are the soul's final authority and true teacher. (b) Likewise,
he insists, Holy Scripture is undeniably true, and anything that contradicts it
false. 77 (c) Again, in his polemical works against Roscelin and the Greeks,
Anselm insists on his fidelity to the creeds78 and deploys conciliar findings
as premisses in his arguments. 79 (d) Anselm also recognizes the authority of
the pope to administer doctrinal correction. 80 (e) Similarly, he pays his respects to the Church fathers. 81
Moreover, in his Epistola de Incamatione Verbi, a polemical work written
against Roscelin's deviant views about Trinity and Incarnation, Anselm becomes strident in his insistence that
" ... no Christian ought to debate whether something which the Catholic
Church believes with its heart and confesses with its mouth is false. On the
contrary, by clinging constantly and unhesitatingly to this same faith, by
loving it and living humbly according to it, the Christian ought to search for
the reason which shows why this faith is true. If he is able to understand, then
let him give thanks to God. But if he cannot, then instead of tossing it about
with his horns, let him bow his head in veneration before it. For when
self-confident human wisdom pits its horns against this stone, it can uproot
them more quickly than it can roll the stone ... "82

Does Anselm hereby cross the border from a pedagogical to an authoritarian
conception of proper respect for authorities (a)-(e)? In my judgment, the
answer is "no." Even in this passage, Anselm commends faith-seeking-understanding as the Christian's vocation. His methodological prohibition
against doubting the truth of the Catholic faith rather reflects his deep appreciation of the difficulty of the subject matter; his testy tone, impatience with
an influential churchman not considering how his example might lead ele-
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mentary students astray. Where the deepest mysteries of the faith are concerned (and surely Trinity, Incarnation, and Human Redemption are numbered among these), even Anselm's epistemic position is less advantageous
than that of the average high school geometry student: just as the latter will
get nowhere is his "proofs" transgress the theorem that the interior angles of
a triangle equal 180 degrees, even though a mathematical genius might invent
a new branch of geometry thereby; so, Anselm believes, we humans will
never make theological progress by denying Scripture, creeds, or conciliar
pronouncements, or by rejecting the institutional correction of the Church.
Just as the best of Anselm's student interlocutors, for all of their intellectual
skill, insight, and initiative, have not outgrown their need for his guidance,
so not even theological stars such as Anselm will ever graduate from the
tutelage of authority.
Indeed, Anselm repeats in this polemical context, the doctrine outlined in
the Monologion and taken for granted in the Proslogion: viz., that where such
advanced topics are concerned, intellectual expertise does not suffice for
progress. Rather the focus of the whole self is important, the coordination of
intellectual effort with disciplined exercize of the soul's other powers, is
necessary. Thus, in Epistola de lncarnatione Verbi, Anselm describes the
requisite holistic preparation as involving (i) faith, (ii) humble obedience to
Divine precepts, and (iii) discipline to resist carnal passions. 83 The soul who
trains will and emotions as well as reason will be capable of a closer approach, a clearer view; the knowledge thus gained, contrast with that acquired
through a merely intellectual route, as first hand "experience" to hearsay.84
By contrast, those who refuse to begin with faith, and who controvert or doubt
the deliverance of the Fathers are like "bats and owls, who see the sky only
at night" and yet "dispute about the midday rays of the sun with eagles"; they
will descend into all sorts of errors. 85 Likewise, those who persistently refuse
the discipline of will and emotions may even lose what little understanding
they possessed. 86 At the close of the chapter, Anselm re-emphasizes the pedagogical concern behind such dire warnings:
") have said these things in order that no one should presume to discuss the
highest questions of faith before he is ready; or, if he should presume to do
so, in order that no difficulty or impossibility of understanding should be able
to shake him from the truth to which he has held by faith .. :'87

Nevertheless, Anselm's working posture towards (a)-(e) is more complex
than these ex professo endorsements would suggest. 3.2.1. Scripture:
Anselm's view of Scripture is bivalent. First and foremost, it is a tutor,
meditation on which and obedience to which "forms" the soul, expresses the
image of God impressed upon it. Without such education, the soul is, as just
noted, in no position to tackle deep mysteries or to second-guess patristic
explanations of them.
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" ... It is vain for someone to try to reply: 'I have understood more than all
my teachers' CPs. 119:99), when he does not dare to add: 'for Thy testimonies
are my meditations' (Ps. 119:99). And he speaks untruthfully if he says, 'I
understand more than the ancients,' when he is unaware that this text goes
on: 'for I have sought Thy commandments' CPs. 119: 100) ..... 88

On the other hand, Anselm the mature monk and theologian consistently treats
Scripture verses as "phenomena to be saved" by his theological theories.
Queries about the meaning of verses are the point of departure in De Veritate
and De Casu Diaboli. 89 In the MonoLogiol1 and Pros/agio/!, as well as the
dialogues, the evolving theory is repeatedly checked for congruence with
Scripture. Yet, fit is often achieved by treating the literal wording of the
Biblical text as a case of improper linguistic usage-a strategy offered as a
methodological tip to the student in De Casu Diaboli:
"T. Be careful not at all to think-when we read in Scripture, or when in
accordance with Scripture we say, that God causes evil or causes not-beingthat 1 am denying the basis for what is said or am finding fault with its being
said. But we ought not to cling to the verbal impropriety concealing the truth
as much as we ought to attend to the tme propriety hidden beneath the many
types of expression. "90

Not that Anselm engages in cynical, or even fanciful (in the manner of some
patristic allegory), explaining away of apparently recalcitrant passages. Rather, he
takes for granted a harmonization of Scripture regulated by creeds and conciliar
pronouncements, and within those parameters offers the sensible renderings of
one whose steeping in Scripture has left him with a devout appreciation of it.
Writing about the controversy between Latin and Greek churches over the
Filioque clause, Anselm eschews another sort of clinging to the words of
Scripture at the expense of intended meaning: to the Greek objection that
Scripture nowhere explicitLy states that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son,
with its accompanying theological rule that we ought not "to assert on our
own opinion, or authority, that which is nowhere stated in Scripture," Anselm
responds with counter-examples that overturn the rule:
" ... where in the Prophets, in the Gospels, or in the Apostles do we read in
just so many words that the one God exists in three persons, or that the one
God is a Trinity, or that God is from God? Nor do we encounter the words
'person' and 'trinity' in that Creed in which the procession of the Holy Spirit
from the Son is also not set forth. Nevertheless, sillce these things clearly
follow from those things which we do read, we steadfastly believe them in
our hearts and confess them with our mouths. Therefore, we ollght to receive
with certainty 1I0t only whatever we read ill Holy Scriptures bllt also whatever
follows from Scripture by rational necessity-as 10l1g as there is no reason
against it ...91

Scriptural statements, like the sometimes cryptic initial formulations of the
teacher in Anselm's dialogues, require explanations, which unfold their deep-
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structure meanings. Theological theory is in no small part intended to do this
job. To be sure, Anselm would grant, the genuine logical consequences of
correctly interpreted Scriptural claims must be true. Yet, just as caution is
always necessary in moving from the direct to the implicit meanings of a
speaker, so Anselm is cautious here about inferences from Scripture. Just as
the student is able to generate independent, apparently sound arguments for
opposing conclusions, without being able to penetrate to the resolution of the
apparent contradiction; so the most spiritually mature and intellectually advanced of human beings might go astray in extrapolating the implications of
Holy Writ. Thus, Anselm stipulates, as a safe-guard, that not only must the
further assertions seem to follow, but also that no other (equally good) reasons
can be cited against them.
3.2.2. Authority and the "Threat" of Novelty: Anselm's theological community took the limitations of human reason in relation to God, so seriously
that it adopted a vigorous "hermeneutics of suspicion" towards novelty,
whether of content or theological method, and esteemed patristic and Bible
the lecture-commentary as the approved genre. Anselm shows himself sensitive to such worries but unwilling to be bound by them. (i) On the one hand,
Anselm submitted his first treatise, the Monoiogion, to Lanfranc, his former
ecclesiastical superior, for criticism. But the latter's objection to Anselm's
method-of bracketing the authority of Scripture and the Fathers, and attempting to establish Christian beliefs about the being, nature, and triunity
of God sola ratione (see section IV below)-brought neither alteration nor
withdrawal from publication, but only the addition of an explanatory prologue, in which Anselm defends the utility of his method, while assuring the
reader that his content is not new (being prefigured in Augustine's De Trinitate).92 (ii) Likewise, if Anselm concedes, in the opening chapter of Cur Deus
HOII/O, that what ought to be said about human redemption can be sufficiently
gleaned from the Fathers,93 he spends roughly half of the first book (!.iii-x)
allowing the dialogue unfold how patristic solutions are inadequate to (past
and current) infidel objections, hereby reinforcing his justificati<?n for a new
investigation. 94 (iii) Again, in De Processiolle Spiritus Sancti, Anselm ventures to justify the sixth-century addition of the Filioque clause to the Nicene
creed by the Latin Church. He argues, on the one hand, that it is implicit in
Scripture and not contradicted by other considerations, and on the other, that
its insertion was a necessary response to a new context of misunderstandings.
New historical contexts raise different puzzles, which call in turn for further
explicit development of doctrine. 95
In sum, where the dichotomy of tradition and novelty is concerned, Anselm
finds that human limitations cut both ways. On the one hand, fruitful inquiry
into the mysteries of Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption requires the spiritual formation of all human dimensions under the tutelage of Scripture. No
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one should expect to discover any new insights about these topics, apart from
prior careful preparation of mind, will, and emotions. At the same time, these
subjects are so profound, that human inquiry will never exhaust them. 96 Since
it is a human duty that faith should seek understanding,Y7 and since the Holy
Spirit is promised to Christians in every age, the well-prepared and persistent
can hope for fresh discoveries. 98 For him, it is criteria I that the latter will
never contradict Scripture or the creeds, but at most elaborate their meanings
and implications. For the most part, new investigations will not oppose, but
rather expose the theoretical underpinnings of patristic claims.
Yet, the mature Anselm was willing to venture novelties of content as well
as method. Not only does he supplant the Ransom Theory of the ancients with
his classic formulation of the satisfaction-theory; he also ventures, with heavy
warnings that his conclusions are tentative and without prejudice to a better
opinion99 -into speculative areas (e.g., whether or not God's first choice
included humans or only angels in the created popUlation of heaven,loo and
how God took a sinless human nature from Adam's race llll ). Thus, for all his
genuine humility, Anselm did not engage in false modesty, and was willing,
by implication, to present himself as wiser than some of his teachers! In the
words of Benedicta Ward, "Anselm ... writes as being himself one of the
Fathers."102
None of this means that Anselm was insincere or equivocal in identifying
Scripture, Church dogma, or the Fathers as auctoritates. Rather Anselm is a
pioneer-representative of a methodological transition that came to full flower
in the thirteenth and fourteenth century universities: viz., that from the lectiomethod which focussed on the assimilation and exegesis of texts, to the
quaestio- and disputatio-methods which used apparently conflicting auctoritates to focus theological questions which were pursued by the methods
of dialectic and "determined" by the auctoritas of the teacher.I03
3.3.3. Ecclesiastical Personages: Certainly, Anselm recognized, submitted
to, and defended the authority of the bishop of Rome, in both the political
and intellectual spheres. As noted above, he submits Cur Deus Homo to the
pope, and uses the Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi and De Processione Spiritus Sancti to lay his arguments against Roscelin and the Greeks before the
pope. Likewise, before "publishing" the MOl1ologion, he sent it to Lanfranc,
his former teacher and religious superior at Bec. In theory, Anselm's general
estimate of human capacities makes him adopt a posture of openness to
correction from all and sundry. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful to what degree
he really expected legitimate philosophico-theological correction from his
contemporaries. As already noted, he did not alter or withhold the Monologiol1 from "publication," despite Lanfranc's objections. Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi and De Processione Spiritus Sancti seem written to instruct
the reader as much as to inforlll him of the orthodoxy of Anselm's actual
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views. The closing paragraph of Cur Deus Homo affirms Anselm's receptiveness to reasonable correction,I04 but at the beginning he claims to have
achieved an "elegant" solution lO5 ; even at controversial points his arguments
impose a burden of rebuttal on those who disagree. 106

IV. The Power to Convince:
Anselm's strategy in addressing his various audiences is straightforward:
begin with common premisses and proceed by valid arguments to his desired
conclusions. 107 4.1 Varying the Data-Base: What counts as a "common" assumption is a function both of intended audience and announced purpose. (1)
In the MonoLogioll, Anselm addresses a two-fold audience: his monastic student brothers, who requested that he proceed by rational necessity l08 without
appeal to Scriptural authority; and ignorantes who for one reason or another
do not believe and whom he hopes to persuade soLa ratione,109 on the basis
of premisses they already accept, (a) that God exists and (b) is the source of
all goods and Himself the Good that satisfies, and (c) that the rational thing
to do is commit oneself to God in living faith. (2) Although the ProsLogion
is a prayer-exercize for believers, one of Anselm's aims in the sections devoted to intellectual striving (cc.ii-xiii, xvii-xxiii) is to achieve a theoretical
advance over the MOlloLogion, by finding simpler proofs for a sub-set of its
results: viz., [i] that God truly exists, [ii] that all things need Him for their
being and well-being, and [iii] other Christian beliefs about the Divine substance (as opposed to triunity).IIO Comments in his Reply to Gaunilo make
evident Anselm's assumption that such ProsLogion arguments inherit the
MonoLogion's accessibility to unbelievers as well. 11I (3) Cur Deus Homo
appears, in the beginning, to aim at a general audience, but to narrow its focus
at I.x to those (perhaps certain Jews and Moslems, as well as Christians) who
accept certain Biblical claims about God and some theses about angelology.1l2
Clearly bracketed are "all beliefs about Christ," because it is the necessity
and soteriological efficacy of the Incarnation and Passion that are to be
proved by necessary (Le., cogent) reasons. 113 (4) In De Processione Spiritus
Sancti, Anselm's aim is to inform and instruct Latin, while persuading Greek
Christians that the Filioque clause belongs in the Nicene Creed. Accordingly,
he takes for granted the many points of agreement between the two churches,
and brackets Latin adherence to the Filioque, in order to prove the latter from
the former. 114 (5) EpistoLa de [Ilcarnatiolle Verb{ looks to a Latin Christian
audience, and addresses itself to the confusions of those puzzled by the same
questions (about Trinity and Incarnation) that led Roscelin (at least temporarily)
astray.1l5 (6) Anselm's quartet of teaching dialogues are student-exercizes for
an entirely Christian school, whose purpose is as much (or more) technique
development as content mastery.116 De Grammatico focuses entirely on issues
of semantics, and involves no doctrinal premisses. Anselm introduces the
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other three-De Veritate, De Libertate Arbitrii, and De Casu Diaboli-as
concerned with "the study of Holy Scripture.""7 And to some extent, their
topics do involve the clarification of Scripture, or how one Christian belief
fits together with another. Consequently, little or no attention is paid to
whether unbelievers would accept the premisses of Anselm's explanations.
All the same, their results-definitions of truth, justice, freedom of choice,
and a theory of created motivational psychology-are clearly among those
Anselm would commend to ignorantes of whatever kind, and could equally
find support among the beliefs Christians and non-Christians share.
4.2. Confidence in the Conclusions: On Anselm's understanding of human
capacity for inquiry, it follows that our readiness to be convinced by an
argument should depend not only on our willingness to accept the premisses
and apparent validity of the inference, but also on the difficulty of the subject
matter. (i) Thus, he claims to have established conclusions about the existence
and independence of God and the dependence of creatures, with such firmness that even if he did not wish to believe them, he would be forced to do
SO.1I8 (ii) As to the Divine nature, because of its simplicity and eternity, the
surface level expressive power of our language is not geared to it, so that
technical usage has to be devised. 119 Where God's triunity is concerned, our
linguistic and conceptual apparatus are even less well suited to their task;
and while analogies can rationalize a scheme of usage, sufficient for us to be
confident that God is three-in-one, our intellectual powers cannot penetrate
to how God is three-in-one, or what three God is.'20 (iii) Again, because the
goodness of God is an inexhaustible mystery, our apparently sound arguments
about what perfect goodness would do are especially liable to being overturned. For example, reason seems to dictate "good for good, evil for evil"
and thus to rule out sparing the wicked. '21 But Scriptural and doctrinal claims
of Divine mercy, provoke faith seeking understanding to dig deeper, to the
realization that propriety of retribution can be considered both from the side
of the agent's desert and from the side of the nature of the one who responds:
the propriety of sparing the wicked could stem from the latter.'22 Similarly,
Anselm remarks, ante-lapsum angels couldn't be sure that God would punish
sin, because they couldn't see far enough into His goodness to rule out the
possibility that Divine mercy would simply forgive it without satisfaction. 123
Once again, retrospective authority steers Anselm away from that thesis, but
the notion that it would be unfitting for perfect justice not to demand satisfaction for maximally indecent acts, is commended as reasonable in its own
right. 124 If further reflection is apt to show some of our calculations as wrong,
it is bound to expose even our deepest reflections as superficial and for that
reason distorting.
4.3. The Priority of Faith? We have seen how Anselm does not think a
human being can come to a vision of God through intellectual inquiry alone,
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apart from discipline of will and emotions. Moreover, Anselm firmly contends
that the human telos gives rise to a human duty to follow "right order": viz.,
to believe in order to understand, not to try to understand in order to believe. 125 In the Prosiogion, he appears to go further, asserting of the effort to
"understand" God "a little bit," "unless I believe, I will not understand. "126
Does Anselm, after all or at least sometimes, assert the absolute priority of
faith over understanding, such that an unbeliever cannot come to know any
tenets of the Christian faith through rational arguments? 127
Not necessarily. Perhaps this comment is to be understood in terms of
Anselm's customary division of roles, between the teacher-whose job it is
to take the broader view, to direct the inquiry, distinguishing good questions
from bad ones, and to articulate the insights that resolve the difficulties-and
the student-whose task it is to raise questions and objections, to follow
along, remember, digest and query what the teacher says. Anselm, the teacher,
writes the Monoiogion, pioneering the territory with his own seeking; he is
the explorer-discoverer par excellence. He widens his class room to include
the (hypothetical?) ignorantes besides monastic believers. The book is written with pedagogical consideration, so that both halves of his audience can
track and (with repetition) digest the reasoning; but neither is in a position
at the outset to assume the teacher's role. Again, however active his dialoguestudents, none of them is sufficiently well-developed to take over and guide
the inquiry to a successful conclusion. Likewise, no matter how brilliant the
senior human collaborator, s/he remains a "teacher's aid," metaphysically
incapable of taking the class all by her/himself. "Unless I believe, I will not
understand" is a Biblical quote, which comes as part of a prayer-exercize to
put the soul in a posture of humility before the Divine partner. Thus, Anselm's
point may be that prior faith, which makes this collaboration explicit, is
required for this senior human role.
If so, is not his claim falsified by the existence of non-Christian intellectual
leaders? Moreover, should not Anselm have known better? Even if Anselm
had few or no personal encounters with any among his contemporaries, he
surely knew of and read a little Aristotle (probably the Categories and De
interpretatione), had arguably played the student to Priscian's teacher and
profited from the latter's works. 128
Maybe, but maybe not entirely. Remember, Anselm's own goals are extremely
high-pre-eminently, to see God's face; in the meantime, to understand "a little
bit" about God's being and well-being, His nature, triunity, and goodness.
Further, given his Christian-Platonism, the latter goals are the crown and completion of any intellectual inquiry, because any study into creatures or mathematics is implicitly a study of Divine being and goodness. Wherever one begins,
faith will eventually be required to see the investigation through to the end.
Moreover, Anselm's understanding of human insight as progressive, its
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clarity eventually demanding the focus of all human powers, is compatible
with a highly flexible position. If human beings are multi-dimensional, almost
everyone suffers from "lop-sided" development. Anselm worries, on the one
hand, lest the monastic curriculum exercize will and emotions without developing the intellect; on the other, lest ignorantes think a merely intellectual
approach to God will suffice. Implicitly, his appropriation of pagan insights
recognizes the possibility of disciplining all three human faculties up to a
point of considerable skill outside the context of faith. Just as in the former
cases the lagging dimensions will have, sooner or later, to "catch up" and
coordinate with gains along the others; so pagan expertise will have to be
transplanted in the soil of faith. As with some church fathers, including the
philosopher Clement of Alexandria and St. Augustine himself, many former
understandings will survive, but with new coloration; others will prove
wrongheaded and wither away. Naturally, how much the new context affects
the truth-values of propositions depends on the field in question (e.g., less
for mathematics than for value claims, as Anselm's discussion of justice and
mercy makes clear), but even where these remain unaltered the significance
of such claims will be transformed.

v. Anselm s Stance,

Contrasting Postures:

We have seen that Anselm's method in philosophical theology is shaped by
five fundamental factors:
(1)

his appreciation of the ontological incommensuration between God and
creatures;

(2) his commitment to the infallible authority of Scripture as interpreted
through the creeds and conciliar pronouncements;
(3) his conviction that humans are made in God's image;
(4) his conception of inquiry as essentially a Divine-human collaboration;
(5) his understanding of human inquiry as holistic and developmental.

Interestingly, (1) is emphasized more by contemporary theology (from existentialists to feminists to John Hick's most recent book, An Interpretation of
Religion l29 ) than by analytic philosophy of religion, and used to support a
kind of theological scepticism, about human capacity to discover any truth
about the way God is in Godself. Such scepticism is not usually taken as
reason to abolish non-negative "God-talk," but rather seen as grounds for
reductive construals (e.g., for treating it as metaphor, myth, blik, or ideology)
and/or a licence for reconstruction. By contrast, some conservative evangelicals or traditionalist catholics, who join Anselm in (2), use (1) to rationalize
a passive acceptance of authority of the Bible and/or the Church.130
Like the second group, Anselm is no theological sceptic, because (2) he
finds in authority compass and astralabe, tutor and guide. If he agrees with
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the first that human language must be stretched to talk about God-so that
terms are used analogically of the Divine essence, in some sense metaphorically of God's triunity-Anselm continues to insist that such statements
express non-mythological, literal truth, that they are true by correspondence
with the very being of God. Yet, at the center of Anselm's Christian pedagogy,
is his insistence on the human duty to interact with authority, by seeking
understanding; his confidence that we can always make some progress in
discovering the truth about God is grounded in (3)-(5),
Many conservative evangelicals and traditionalist catholics have found
congenial Anselm's notion of theological development-that while one begins with the infallible authority of Scripture, new conflicts and confusions
warrant new explanations, which make explicit what was implicit in the
already given. Such was also the methodology of the Oxford Movement (of
the 1830's-40's) within the Church of England, where it still commands the
allegiance of many Anglo-Catholics today. This position involves the patristic
idea that God has somehow insulated the texts of Scripture and conciliar
pronouncements from the errors to which all human inquiry about God is
otherwise so prone (a la (l)),
For many (myself included), the results of the historico-critical study of the
Bible have rendered this last assumption (and hence (2)) untenable, exposing as
they appear to do how deeply the human collaborators have shaped the text (cf.
(4)). Such studies underscore the validity of (1), while construing (5) not only
individually but collectively: the ontological and epistemical gap between God
and humans is so great, that it took generations for the human race to work up
to a plausible approximation of the right idea! On this re-working of Anselmian
themes, Scripture and creeds remain authoritative, not as infallible dictates, but
as tutors to which one submits for spiritual formation and from whom the philosophical theologian or Christian philosopher should never depart lightly or in
haste. Yet, just as the interactive study of authority has led many to "find"
theological development within the Bible itself; so we might expect with
Anselm that-since (3) God made us in His image and (4) gives the Holy Spirit
in every age-further progress towards the truth about God might be made in our
day as well. If some understandings seem to be "outgrown" in the Bible (e.g.,
that God might be jealous of human achievements in building sky scrapers in
Genesis 11: 1-9), so-with all due caution-we are not entitled to dismiss a priori
all contradictions of Scripture as ipso facto mistaken. 131 If this estimate of
the Bible erodes security about our sense of intellectual direction, it spawns
greater optimism, about the Divine collaborator's willingness to be patient
with dull-witted and silly students, as about His pedagogical resourcefulness
in redeeming our errors. 132
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NOTES
1. Monologioll, c.xxxi; S 1.49-50; c.Ixviii-lxix; S 1.78-84; De Veritate, c.ii; S. 1.178-79;
c.iv; S 1.180-8; c.vii; S 1.185,6-186,4.

2. Monologioll, c.lxviii; S 1.78, 25-79.1: "omne rationale ad hoc existere, ut sicut ratione
discretionis aliquid magis vel minus bonum sive non bonum iudicat, ita magis vel minus
id amet aut respuat."
3. Monologion, c. Ixviii; S 1.79, 2-3: "rationalem creaturam ad hoc esse factum, ut
summam essentiam amet super omnia bona, sicut ipsa est summum bonum."
4. Proslogion, c.i; S 1.98, 14-15: "Denique ad te videndum factus sum ....• Likewise,
Anselm speaks of Adam's losing the "beatitudinem ad quam factus est" (S 1.98, 18).
5. Cf. Proslogioll, c.xxiv-xxvi; S 1.117, 25-122, 2.
6. Cur Deus HOIIIO, Il.i; S 1.97, 4-98, 5: "Rationalem naturam a deo factam esse iustam,
ut iIlo fruendo beata esset, dubitari non debet. Ideo namque rationalis est, ut discemat inter
iustum et iniustum, et inter bonum et malum, et inter magis bonum et minus bonum.
Alioquin frustra facta essent rationalis. Sed deus non fecit earn rationalem frustra. Quare
ad hoc earn factam esse rationalem dubium non est. Simili ratione probatur quia ad hoc
accepit potestatem discemendi, ut odisset et vitaret malum, ac amaret et eligeret bonum,
atque magis bonum magis amaret et eligeret. Aliter namque frustra iIIi deus dedisset
potestatem istam discemendi, quia in vanum discemeret, si secundum discretionem non
amaret et vitaret. Sed non convenit ut deus tantam potestatem frustra dederit. Ad hoc itaque
factam esse rationalem naturam certum est, ut summum bonum super omnia amaret et
eligeret, non propter aliud, sed propter ipsum. Si enim propter aliud, non ipsum sed aliud
amat. At hoc nisi iusta fa cere nequit. Ut igitur frustra non sit rationalis, simul ad hoc
rationalis et iusta facta est. Quod siad summum bonum eligendum et amandum iusta facta
est, aut talis ad hoc facta est, ut aliquando assequeretur quod amaret et eligeret, aut non.
Sed si ad hoc iusta non est facta, ut quod sic amat et eligit assequatur, frustra facta est
talis, ut sic iIlud amet et eligat, nec ulla erit ratio cur iIIud assequi debeat aliquando.
Quamdiu ergo amando et eligendo summum bonum iusta faciet, ad quod facta est, misera
erit, quia indigens erit contra voluntatem, non habendo quod desiderat; quod nimis
absurdum est. Quapropter ratiollalis lIatura iusta/acta est, ut summo boliO, id est deo,fruendo
beata esset. HOlllo ergo qui rationalis natura est,Jactus est iustus ad hoc, ut deo fruendo beatus
esset. "
7. MOIIOlogioll, c.xxviii; S 1.46, 8-16, 29: "alia omnia mutabiliter. .. inlabili
brevissimoque et vix existente praesenti sunt vix est. .. non immerito ... asseruntur fere non
esse et vix esse ... aliquo modo recte non esse .....
8. Proslogioll, c.xv; S 1.112,14-17.
9. Proslogioll, c.i; S 1.98, 3-5; c.ix; S 1.107, 4-27; c.xiv; S 1.I1l, 22-112, ll; c.xvi; S
1.112,19-113,4; Cur Deus HOII/o, l.ii; S 11.50, 3-13.
10. MOllologioll, c.xxxvi; S 1.54, 15-18; c.lxiv; S 1.74, 30-1.75,16.
11. MOllologioll, c.xv; S 1.28, 3-17,13,16,25; c.xxviii; S 1.46, 20; Proslogioll, c.xvii;
S 1.113, 13.
12. De Libertate Arbitrii, c.iii; S 1.212, 19-c.iv; S 1.214, 12; cf. De Casu Diaboli, cc.
xii-xvii; S 1.251, 22-262, 19; De COllceptu Virgillali et de Origillali Peccato, cc. i-ii; S
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11.140, 3-142, 10; De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestillatiollis et Gratiae Dei cum
Libero Arbitrio, IIl.i-vi; S 1.263, 4-73, 6.

13. Proslogiol/, c.i; S 1.98, 16-99, 14; c.xviii; S 1.113, 18-114, 13.
14. Monologion, cc.lxv-Ixvii; S 1.75, 19-78, 1.

15. MOll%gion, c.lxvii-Ixviii; S 1.78, 1-79,9.
16. Proslogioll, c.xxvi; S 1.121,22-122,2: " ... Meditetur iterim inde mells /Ilea, loquatur
inde lingua /Ilea. Amet iIIud cor /Ileum, sennocinetur os meulI/. Esuriat illud anima mea,
sitiat caro /Ilea, desideret tota substantia /Ilea, donec intrem 'in gaudium domini' mei, 'qui
est' trinus et unus deus 'benedictus in saecula. Amen.'"
17. Anselm consistently sounds this theme in the prayers, and it is a key premiss in his
Cur Deus Homo argument for the necessity ofthe Incarnation. His works are riddled with
prayers for Divine aid in his theological inquiries as well as thanksgiving for help received.
Cf. Proslogio/), c.ii; S 1.101, 1-2; c.ix; S 1.108, 8-10; c.xiv; S 1.111, 23-112, 11; c.xviii; S
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18. Cf. De Concordia, III.6-8; S 1.271, 20-276, 5.
19. MOllologion, c.lxxv; S I.83, 10-13.
20. Mon%giol1, c.xv; S 1.28, 5-8: "Quamquam enim miror, si possit in nominibus vel
verbis quae aptamus rebus factis de nihil reperiri, quod digne dicatur de creatrice universorum substantia, telltandum tamen est, ad quid hac indagationem ratio perducet." Italics
mine. Translation from Jasper Hopkins, A New Interpretive Translation of St. Anselm s
MOIlO/ogioll alld Pros/ogion (Minneapolis, MN: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1986), 93.
21. MOllologion, c.xliii; S 1.59, 15-17: ..... Inventis tot et tantis singulorum proprietatibus, quibus mira quaedam tam ineffabilis quam inevitabilis, in summa unitate probatur
esse pluralitas: valde mihi videtur delectabile retractare saepius tam impenetrabile secretulll ... " Italics mine. Translation, Hopkins, 157.
22. Proslogioll, ci; S 1.98, 1-3: "Eia nunc ergo tu, domine deus meus, doce cor meus,
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Arbitrio, III.6; S 1.270, 14-21: " ... Sciendum quia, sicut terra innumerabiles herbas et
arbores, sine quibus humana natura alitur aut etiam quibus perimitur, sine omni hominis
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studio sponte quasi genninant cogitationes et voluntates nihil utiles saluti aut etiam noxias,
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semine et laboriosa cultura concipiunt aut genninant. .. " Translation from Anse/m of
Canterbury: Volume Two, edited and translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson
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29. Monoiogion, c.lxviii; S 1.78, 25-79, 5; Prosiogioll, c.i; S 1.98,14-15,18; Cur Deus
Homo, H.i; S 1.97,4-98,5.
30. De Libertate Arbitrii, c.iii-iv; S 1.210, 28-214, 12; De Concordia, 1.6; S II.256,
14-257, 18; IIl.xiii; S II.285, 7-287, 21.
31. De Casu Diaboli, cc.xii-xiv; S 1.251, 22-259, 4; De Concordia, III.lI-13; S 1.278,
27-287,21.

32. De Casu Diaboli, cc.i-iii; S 1.233, 6-240, 13.
33. De Casu Diaboli, cc.xii-xiv; S 1.251,22-259,4; c.xvii; S 1.263, 5-32; De Concordia,
III. 12-13; S 1.284, 22-287, 21.
34. Cur Deus Homo, passi/ll.
35. Cur Deus H011lo, Il.xvi; S II.118, 5-20.
36. De Concordia, III.6; S 1.272, 28-273, 6; III.8-9; S 1.274, 19-278, 10.
37. Orationes sive Meditatiolles, A. Orationes, I; S III.5, 3-6, 17: "Omnipotens deus et
misericors pater et bone domine, miserere mihi peccatori. Da mihi veniam peccatorum
meorum. Cavere, vincere omnes insidias et tentationes et delectationes noxias; perfecte
mente et actu vi tare quae prohibes, facere et servare quae iubes. Credere, sperare, amare,
vivere quod et quantum et ut scis et vis. Compunctionem pietatis et humilitatis, discretam
abstinentiam et carnis mortificationem. Ad te amandum, orandum, laudandum, meditandum.
Ad omnem secundum te actum et cogitatum puram, sobriam, devotam, veracem mentem et
efficacem; mandatorum tuorum notitiam, dilectionem, delectation em, facilitatem et effectum.
Semper, domine, ad meliora cum humilitate proficere, et numquam deficere.
"Ne committas me, domine, meae nec humanae ignorantiae aut infirmitati, neque meis
meritis, nee alii quam tuae piae dispositioni; sed to ipse c1ementer dispone me et omnes
cogitatus et actus meos in beneplacito tuo, ut fiat a me et in me et de me tua semper solum
voluntas. Libera me ab omni malo, et perduc me ad vitam aetemam, per dominum."
Translated by Benedicta Ward, The Prayers alld Meditations of St. Anselm with the
Prosiogion (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973), 91-92.
38. Commendatio; S 11.40, 5-7.
39. Cf. Proslogion, c.i; S 1.97,4-10.
40. As Anselm repeatedly does in his works: cf. Proslogion, c.i; S i.97, 4-100, 19;
cc.xiv-xviii; S 1.111, 8-115, 4; and passim. Cur Deus Homo, I.i; S 11.49, 3-6; Il.ii; S II.50,
3-6; Lxxv; S 1I.95, 1-96, 20; Il.xvii; S 11.126, 5-19. De Concordia; S 1.245, 3-5; III. 14; S
1.288, 11-19. Cf. De COllceptu Virgil/ali et de Origillali Peccato, c.xxix; S 11.173, 4-7; and
De Processione Spiritus Sallcti, c.xvi; S II.219, 27-28.

41. Cur Deus Homo, l.i; S II.48, 16-18; Commendatio; S 1.40, 10-12.
42. Prosiogion, c.ii; S 1.101,4-7; c.vi; S I.l 04,20-25; c.vii; S 1.105, 9-11; c.viii; S 1.l06,
5-8; c.ix; S 1.106, 18-107,3; c.x; S 1.108, 23-25; c.xi; S 1.109, 10-24; c.xviii; S 1.114,
14-18; c.xix; S I.l15, 7-9; c.xx; S 1.I15, 18-20.
43. Pros/ogioll, c.xiii; S 1.110, 12-19.
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44. Prosiogion, c.ii; S I.101, 1-2; x.ix; S I.108, 8-10; c.xiv; S I.1ll, 23-112, ll; c.xviii;
S I.114, 8-13.
45. Proslogion, c.iv; S I.104, 5-7; c.xiv; S I.lll, 22-23; ll2, 5-6, 9-1l; 1l2, 27-113, l.
46. Proslogion, c.ix; S 1.108, II.
47. Proslogion, c.xxvi; S 1.121, 4-6; cf. 1.120, 23-26; and c.xiv; S 1.1l1, 22-23.
48. Conclusions addressed to God: c.iii; S 1.102, 3-9; c.vi; S 1.105, 4-6; c.vii; S 1.105,
27-106,2; c.viii; S 1.l06, 9-14; c.xi; S 1.110,1-3; c.xii; S 1.110, 6-8; c.xvii; S 1.113, 8-15;
c.xxii; S 1.116, 15-1l7, 2; c.xxiii; S 1.117, 6-16.

49. Proslogion, c.iv; S 1.103,5-7; cf. the "shores" of prayer and praise in cc.i, xiv-xviii,
xxiv-xxvi. In the few passages lacking explicit address, what precedes and follows makes
the context of continuing prayer is clear. Cf. Proslogion, c.ii; S 1.101, 7-102, 3; c.iii; S
1.102,6-103,2; c.xxi; S 1.116, 6-12; c.iii; S 1.102,9-11; c.xxiii; S 1.117,16-22.
50. Commendatio; S H.40, 10-12: "inter fidem et speciem intellectum quem in hac vita
capimus esse medium intelligo: quanto aliquis ad ilIulll proficit, tanto eum propinquare
speciei, ad quam omnes anhelamus, existimo."

51. Cur Deus Homo, l.i; S 11.47, 8-9: "quod petunt, non ut per rationem ad fidem
accedant, sed ut eorum quae credunt intellectu et contemplatione delectentur ... " Cf.
Commendatio; S H.39, 4-6. Also Pros/ogio/!, c.xxvi; S 1.120, 23-122, 2.
52. MOIIO/ogioll, c.xxxi; S 1.49, I-50, 13; c.xxxvi; S 1.54, 18-55, 6. Cf. De Veritate,
c.vii; S 1.185, 6-186, 4.
53. Anselm exempts Christ's human nature from the necessity for such education; he
contends that it was omniscient, because no purpose would be served by the Divine Word's
assuming our ignorance, in addition to our ability to die. Cf. Cur Deus Homo, Il.xiii; S
II.112, 16-113, 18.
54. Here I make allowances for prodigies such as Mozart, who seem to require much
less education.

55. Prosiogioll, c.i; S 1.100, 18-19: ..... Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed
credo ut intelligam. Nam et hoc credo: quia 'nisi credidero, non intelligam. ,,, Cf. Cur Deus
Homo, l.i; S II.47, 8-9; 48, 16-18; Epistola de lncarnalione Verbi, sec. I; S II.
56. E.g., in response to the teacher's contention that sin does not take away freedom of
choice but only the occasion to use it, the student replies, "Credo, sed intelligere desidero"
(De Libertate Arbitrii, c.iii; S 1.211, 1). Again, regarding the claim that fallen angels would
not be condemned if they were not guilty, the student declares, "Certus sum enim, etiamsi
non videam" (De Casu Diaboli, c.ii; S 1.235, 27; cf. c.iv; S 1.240, 22-23). Likewise, to the
contention that the good angels were able to sin before the evil ones fell, the student
responds, "Puto, sed ratione comprehendere vellem" (De Casu Diaboli, c.v; S 1.242, 28).

57. Cur Deus HOII/O, l1.xiii; S 11.113, 17-18: ..... Saepe namque aliquid esse certi sumus,
et tamen hoc ratione probare nescimus."
58. De Grammatico, cc.i-ii; S 1.145, 4-146,26; c.iii; S 1.147, 21-48, 6; De Veritate, c.i;
S 1.176; S 1.4-20; De Libertate Arbitrii, c.i; S 1.207, 4-10; c.ii; S 1.209, 13-26; De Casu
Diaboli, c.ii; S 1.235, 20-236,9; c.vii; S 1.244, 11-245, 18; c.x; S 1.247, 6-28; c.xxi; S
1.266,15-267,19.
59. Cf. De LibertateArbitrii, c.i; S 1.208,1-13; c.ii; S 1.209, 27-210, 21; c.iii; S 1.210,
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25-211, 1; C.v; S 1.214,25-17,24-26; c.vi; S 1.217, 10-22; c.viii; S 1.220, 12-16, C.x; S
1.222, 20; c.xi; S 1.222, 26-223, 2; c.xiii; S 1.225,4-9.
60. The student offers linguistic (De Libertate Arbitrii, C.v; S 1.214, 24-26) and experiential (c. vi; S 1.217, 20-25) counter-evidence to the teacher's claim that the wilJ cannot be
overcome by temptation. Likewise, he wonders whether God is a counter-example to the
teacher's claim that no alien force can coerce an upright will to sin (c.viii; S 1.220, 12-16).

61. Cur Deus Homo, Lxxv; S 11.95, 15-22.
62. E.g., he asks whether humans were part of God's original creative plan, or whether
we were made only to fi1l up the number offallen angels (Cur Deus Homo, Lxvi; S 11.74,
14; Lxviii; S 11.84, 3); how God was able to take a sinless human nature from Adam's race
(Cur Deus Homo, Il.xvi; S 11.116, 16-24; 117, 18-22); and whether Christ's death wasn't
necessary, on the assumption that Mary was cleansed by it in advance (Cur Deus Homo,
II.xvi; S 11.120, 2-11).

63. Cur Deus HOIIIO, !.iii; S 11.50, 16-22.
64. Cur Deus HOIIIO, Lvii; S 11.55, 13-59,5.
65. For example, in De Veritate, when the student appeals to Aristotelian-Boethian
correspondence as an account of truth of statement, the teacher denies it is definitional,
but then allows it to stand as a statement of truth-conditions within the teacher's teleological account of what truth is. Again, in De Libertate Arbitrii, the teacher rejects the
student's proposal- 'power to sin and power not to sin' -as definitional of free choice,
but allows it to stand as a de facto necessary condition of imputability.
66. The teacher offers the final definitions in De Veritate (cc.xi-xii; S 1.191, 3-196, 25)
and De Libertate Arbitrii (c.iii; S 1.211, 5-212, 23; c.xiv; S 1.226, 3-21). Likewise, in De
Gramlllatico, it is the teacher who supplies the key distinction between signification and
appellation, which renders consistent the conclusion that grallllllaticus is both substance
and quality. A fortiori, in Cur Deus HOIIIO, Anselm is the one who advances both the
negative case-that human redemption is impossible without an Incarnation (in Lxi-xxii;
S 11.68, 3-96, 4)-and the positive account of how a God-man saves us (in 1I.i-xxv; S
IL97, 4-133,11).
67. De Libertate Arbitrii, c.i; S 1.207, 4-10.
68. De Libertate Arbitrii, c.iii; S 1.211, 5-212, 23.
69. De Libertate Arbitrii, c.xiii; S L225, 4-28.
70. De Libertate Arbitrii, c.xiii, S 1.223, 26-224, 30.
71. Cf. De Libertate Arbitrii, c.xii; S 1.224, 26-30.

72. De Gramlllatico, c.xxi; S 1.168, 7-12: "D ... nec aliquid iis quae in hac disputatione
asseruisti, obici reele posse existimo. M. Nec mihi nunc videtur. Tamen quoniam scis
quantum nostris temporibus dialectici certent de quaestione a te proposita, nolo te sic iis
quae diximus inhaerere, ut ea pertinactier teneas, si quis validioribus argumentis haec
destruere et diversa valuerit astruere. Quod si contingerit; saltern ad exercitationem
disputandi nobis haec profecisse non negabis."
73. MOllologioll, c.xviii; S 1.33, 11-22; cf. De Veritate, c.i; S 1.176,4-19; c.xiii; S 1.196,
28-199,29.
74. Meditatio, 3; S 111.85, 32-34; cf. Epistola, 56; S I1I.171, 15-16.
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75. Cur Deus Homo, I1.xiii; S II.215, 14-19.
76. De Processiolle Spiritus Sallcti, c.xvi; S 11.219,23-29.
77. Cur Deus HOIllO, I.xviii; S 11.82, 8-10; cf. De Concordia, III.6; S 11.272, 4-7.
78. Epistola, 136; S 111.280, 16-26; Epistola de illcarnatione verbi, prior recensio, 4: S
1.283, 11-15).
79. Epistola de illcarnatione verbi; S 11.5,1-14; 11,15-17; 13,4-21; 15,19-20; 16,3-5;
20, 16-19,22, 14-16; 24, 9-10; 28,71-5; 29, 29-30. De processiolle Spiritus Sancti; S
11.177,5-19; 178, 13-15; 181, 13-14; 185, 16-25; 188, 1-4; 190,30-32; 194,12-20; 200,
3-5; 205, 18-21; 206, 8-11; 207, 26-29; 210, 21-34; 211, 1-3; 212, 25-27; 218, 22-23.
80. Cf. Commendatio operis ad Urbanum Papam II; S 11.41,1-5: "Quapropter, mi pater
et domine, Christianis omnibus cum reverentia amande et cum amore reverende papa
Urbane, quem dei providentia in sua ecclesia summum constituit pontificem: quoniam
nulli rectius possum, vestrae sanctitatis praesento conspectui subditum opusculum, ut eius
auctoritate quae ibi suscipienda sunt approbentur, et quae corrigenda sunt emendentur."
Cf. Epistola de Incamatione Verbi, c.i; S II.3, 7-4, 4: "Quoniam divina providentia vestram
elegit sanctitatem, cui fidem et vitam Christianam custodiendam et ecclesiam suam
regendam committeret, ad nullumalium recti us refertur, sed quid contra catholicam fidem
oritur in ecclesia, ut eius auctoritate corrigatur; nec ulli alii tutius si quid contra errorem
respondetur ostenditur, ut eius prudentia examinetur. Quapropter sicut nulli dignius
possem, ita nulli libentius praesentem epistolam quam vestrae destino sapientiae, quatenus
si quid in ea corrigendum est, vestra censura castigetur, et quod regulam veritatis tenet,
vestra auctoritate roboretur."
81. Cf. his apology in Monologion, Prologus; S 1.8,8-20. Likewise, his concession that
the fathers had already adequately covered the subject matter of Cur Deus HOlllo (Li; S
11.48, 9- 10).

82. Epistola de Incamatiolle Verbi, c.i; S 11.6, 10-7,6: ..... Nullus quippe Christian us
debet disputare, quomodo quod catholica ecclesia corde credit et ore confitetur non sit;
sed semper eandem fidem indubitanter tenendo, amanda et secundum ilIam vivendo
humiliter quantum potest quaerere rationem quomodo sit. Si potest intelligere, deo gratias
agat; si non potest, non immittat cornua ad ventilandum, sed submittat caput ad
venerandum. Citius enim potest in se confidens humana sapientia impingendo cornua sibi
evellere, quam innitendo petram hanc evolvere ... " Translation in Anselm of Canterbury:
Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption: Theological Treatises, edited and translated by Jasper
Hopkins and Herbert W. Richardson (New York: Harper & Row, 1970),8. Italics mine.
83. Epistola de Incarnatiolle Verbi, c.i; S 11.8, 7-19.
84. Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi, c.i; S 11.9, 5-8; ..... Nimirum hoc ipsum quod dico:
qui non crediderit, non intelliget. Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur; et qui expertus
non fuerit, non cognoscet. Quantum enim rei auditum superat experientia, tantum vincit
audientis cognitionem experientis scientia."
85. Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi, c.i; S 1.7, 6-8, 6.
86. Epistola de Incarnatiolle Verbi, c.i; S 11.9,9-19.
87. Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi, c.i; S 11.10, 14-17: "Haec dixi ne quis, antequam sit
idoneus, altissimas de fide quaestiones praesumat discutere; aut si praesumpserit, nulla difficultas
aut impossibilitas intelligendi valeat ilium a veritate cui per fidem adhaesit excutere ... "
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88. Epistola de Incarnatione M!rbi, c.i; S 11.9, 1-4: " ... Frustra quippe conatur dicere:
'super omnes docentes me intellexi,' qui proferre non audet: 'quia testimonia tua meditatio
mea est.' Et mendaciter pronuntiat: 'super senes intellexi,' cui non est familiare quod
sequitur: 'quia mandata tua quaesivi. .. '"
89. De Casil Diaboli, c.i; S I.233, 6-7.
90. De Casu Diaboli, c.i; S I.235, 8-12: "M. Vide ne ullatenus putes, cum in divinis
Iibris legimus aut cum secundum iIIos dicimus deum facere malum aut facere non esse,
quia negem propter quod dicitur, aut reprehendam quia ita dicitur. Sed non tantum
debemus inhaerere improprietati verborum veritatem tegenti, quantum inhiare proprietati
veritatis sub multimodo genere locutionem latenti." Translation in Anselm of Canterbury,
Volume Two, edited and translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Toronto
2lnd New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1976), 133. Italics mine.
91. De Processione Spiritus SancTi, c.xi; S 11.209, 9-16: "Denique ubi legimus in
propheta aut evangelista aut apostolo his verbis deum unum esse tres personas, aut unum
deum esse trinitatem, aut deum de deo? Sed neque in iIIo symbolo, in quo non est prolata
processio sancti spiritus de filio, invenimus nomen personae vel trinitatis. Quoniam tamen
ex iis quae legimus haec apertissime sequuntur, constanter ea et corde credimus et ore
confitemur. Quare non tantum suscipere cum certitudine debemus quae in sacra scriptura
leguntur, sed etiam ea, quae ex his nulla alia contradicente ratione rationa bili necessitate
sequuntur." Cf. S 11.208, 1-11. Translation in Allselm of Canterbury: Trinity, Incarnation,
and Redemption (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), edited and translated by Jasper
Hopkins and Herbert W. Richardson, 120-21; cf. 118-119. Italics mine.
92. Cf.EpisTola ad Lanfrancllm archepiscopllm; S I.5, 2-6,14; and Prologus; S 1.7,2-8,
26.
93. Cur Deus Homo, I.i; S 11.48,9- 10: "quamvis a sanctis patribus inde quod sufficere
debeat dictum sit. .. "
94. Thus, Martin Grabmann over-estimates Anselm's adherence to patristic authority in
his monumental study, Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Method, Erster Band (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1956) (first published 1909), Funfter Abschnitt, 258-339; esp. 267-69,289.

95. De Processione Spiritus Sancti, c.xiii-xiv; S 11.211, 6-215, 26.
96. Commendiatio; S 11.40,4-5.
97. Cur Deus Homo, I.i; S 11.48, 16-18.
98. Commendatio; S 11.40, 5-7.
99. Cf. Cur DellS Homo, I.ii; S 11.50, 7-12. Cf. De Conceptu Virginali eT Originali
Peccato, c.xxix; S 11.173,4-7.

100. Cllr DellS Homo, Lxviii; S 11.82, 5-16.
101. Anselm offers one explanation in Cur DellS Homo, II.xvi; S II.1l6, 16-122,21,
and devotes the whole of De Conceptll Virginali et Origillali Peccato to the formulation
of another.

102. The Prayers alld MeditaTions of Saint Anselm with the Proslogioll, translated with
introduction by Sister Benedicta Ward, S.L.G. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin
Books, 1973), 49.
103. For helpful discussions of this methodological evolution which, however, curi-
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ously omit Anselm's place in the story, cf. Bernardo C. Bazan, Les Questions Disputees.
Principallllent dans les Facilites de Theologie. de Droit et de Medicine, Primiere Partie
(Brepols: Tumhout, Belgium, 1985), IS-149; and Stephen F. Brown, "Key Tenns in
Medieval Theological Vocabulary," in Civicima: Etudes sur Ie Vocabulaire lntellectuel du
Moyen Age, Ill: Methodes et instruments du travail intellectllel allllloyen age: Etudes sur
Ie vocabulaire (Brepols: Tumhout, Belgium, 1991), 82-96.

104. Cllr Deus Homo, Il.xxii; S ILl33, 12-13.
lOS. Cur Deus Homo, I.i; S 11.48,6-9.

106. Cur Deus Homo, Lxviii; S 11.83, 28-29: "Quod tamen si dicitur, inveniendum erit
quomodo ratae non sint supra positae rationes ... "
107. Anselm gives crisp acknowledgement to this procedure in De Processiolle Spiritus
Sallcti, c.i; S 11.177, IS-17.
108. MOIlOlogioll, Prologus; S 1.7, 10.
109. Monologion, Prologus; S 1.7, 10.
110. Proslogion, Prooemium; S 1.93, 4-10.
Ill. Respollsio editoris; S 1.130, 3-4; cf. sec. VII; S 1.137, 3-S; sec. X; S 1.138-39.
112. Cur Deus Homo, Lx; S 1.67,1-20.
113. Cur Deus Homo, Praefatio; S II.42, 8-43, 3; cf. c.i; S 1.48, 2-S.
114. De Processione Spiritus Sancti, c.i; S II.l77, 3-17.
liS. Epistola de lllcarnatione Verbi, c.i; S 11.5, 22-6, 4.
116. Anselm makes this explicit at the end of De Grammatico, c.xxi; S 1.168, 8-12.
117. Praefatio; S 1.173, 2-3: "Tres tractatus pertinentes ad stlldium sacrae scriptllrae
quondam feci diversis temporibus ..

118. Proslogioll, c.iv; S 1.104, S-7.
119. Monologioll, C.xv; S 1.3-7; cf. cc.xvi-xxv, passim.
120. MOllologion, c.lxiv; S 1.74, 30-7S, 16.
121. Proslogioll, c.ix-xi; S 1.106-111.
122. Proslogioll, c.x; S 1.108-9.
123. De Casu Diaboli, c.xxiii; S 1.270, 4-18.
124. Cur Deus Homo, II.xi-xiii; S 1.68, 3-71, 26.
12S. Cf. Cllr Deus Homo, I.i; S II.47, 8-9; 48, 16-17. Cf. Epistola de lncarnatiolle Verbi,
c.i; S 11.6, 10-7, 6; S 11.8, 7-19; S 11.9, S-8.
126. Proslogion, c.i; S 1.100, 18-19: "Neque enim qllaero intelligere ut credam, sed
credo ut intelligam. Naill et hoc credo: quia 'nisi credidero, non intelJigam."
127. Victor Roberts, in his concern that Anselm should insist on prior faith as an
epistemological necessity, mistakenly insists that "[n]ever in any of his writings does
Anselm speak of bringing" the unbeliever "to conversion by a process of reasoning" (in
"The Relation of Faith and Reason in St. Anselm of Canterbury," The American Benedictine Review XXV (1974), 494-S12; esp. Sll-12.
128. Cf. Desmond Paul Henry, The Logic o/St. Anselm (Oxford at the Clarendon Press,
1967), sec. 3,64-67.
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129. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent
(London: Macmillan Press, 1989).
130. Cf. Avery Dulles, S.J., Models of Revelation (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
& Co., Inc., 1983).

131. The great Anglican theologian Charles Gore outlined such a position in his
influential essay "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration," Lux Mundi (London: John Murray,
Albemarle Street, 1890), 313-62. Gore's focus in this essay was on the impact of higher
criticism on the Old Testament, and was reluctant to follow his logic through to the New
Testament, especially where the events mentioned in the creeds were concerned. Cf. Arthur
Michael Ramsey, An Era ill Anglican Theology: From Gore to Temple (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1960).
132. Research for this paper was made possible by grants from the American Council
of Learned Societies, the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, and the University of
California, President's Humanities Council.

